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Vulnerability and its politics: Precarity






This article is an attempt to unwrite our current disciplinary enamourment with power. We begin from life’s
woundedness, which we argue engenders a limit condition that both precedes power (vulnerability is the
origin of power) and exceeds power (no power can ever resolve the problem of woundedness). To illustrate
this, we introduce the ‘politics of the wound’: a perspective on politics that begins, not from a pre-existing
ontology of forces and relations, but from the condition of striving, in infinitely generous and yet fragile ways,
to claim sovereignty against the incurable wound of being a living being.
Keywords
non-relational, non-representational theory, ontology, politics of wound, power, precarity, vulnerability,
woundedness
I Introduction
It has been almost 30 years since the Italian
philosopher Paolo Virno ([1992] 2004) argued
in his seminal work, Grammar of the Multitude,
that one of the most potent but unremarked upon
features of late capitalism is its capacity to
engender a pervasive sense of global insecurity.
By criticising the way in which an entire tradi-
tion of Western philosophy, from Immanuel
Kant to Martin Heidegger, mobilised the dis-
tinction between fear (which is conditional) and
anguish (which is existential and pervasive),
Virno argues that port-Fordism has created a
context where the two have become irredeem-
ably bound together. It is our current condition,
Virno argues, to continuously dwell in an
uncanny sense of disorientation, to the extent
that the specific dreads and fears of material
insecurity have become constantly experienced
(at an increasingly planetary level) against a
pervasive backdrop of undefinable anguish of
capitalist vulnerability. For Virno, subjects feel
perpetually insecure because their lives are
interminably held out to a globalised economy
that is utterly unmediated and that owes them
nothing. As Isabel Lorey (2015) puts it, in a nod
to Benjamin, precaritisation is no more an
exception, but a rule. Since then a number of
social and political theorists have taken up this
idea in different ways. From Harvey’s (2005)
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argument that precarity is the cornerstone of
flexible production, to Standing’s (2011) work
on the creation of a new precarious class (the
precariat), or to Butler’s (2006) work on vio-
lence and precarious lives, the study of precar-
ity, precariat and precaritisation has been high
on the discipline’s conceptual and empirical
agenda (e.g. Harker, 2012; Harris and Nowicki,
2018; Joronen and Griffiths, 2019a; Lewis et al.,
2015; Strauss, 2018).
Without question, this has been a welcome
addition to the field and our own work (see
Joronen, 2016, 2017, 2019; Rose, 2014) has
benefitted from these debates. But we also
recognise a difference. While the work on pre-
carity currently circulating in the discipline
shares many similarities with our own interests,
there is an enduring inclination in this literature
to approach precarity first and foremost as a
political, social, racial, spatial and/or gender
problem, rather than a profound existential con-
dition definitive for all living beings. Many of
the analyses certainly do recognise the differ-
ence between precarity (as a political/social/
spatial predicament) and precariousness/vul-
nerability (as an existential condition) (Butler,
2010), but when one looks at the trajectory of
these works, one quickly realises the distinction
is mostly made to sequester the latter to focus on
the former (see Brice, 2020; Hammami, 2016;
Hitchen, 2016; Michel, 2016; Neilson and Ros-
siter, 2008; Wilkinson and Ortega-Alcazar,
2019). Whether done with a post-structuralist,
Marxist, postcolonial, ‘affective’, queer, femin-
ist or non-representational twist, work on
precarity consistently emphasises how
precarity is used and induced as a political,
spatial and/or governmental force/capacity (a
means to control, resist, marginalise, exclude
etc.) rather than on carefully thinking through
the ontological implications of existential
precariousness (the implications of our
fundamental vulnerability and exposure to the
wounding and care of others). Our point here is
not to downplay the importance of these works;
we do not dispute that there are politically
driven processes of inducing and/or mitigating
precarities and we have no interest in
minimising the violent or hopeful effects such
a politics can engender (indeed, we have written
about these extensively). However, we are
concerned about the speed with which the
existential dimension is rendered irrelevant; as
if the existential is too philosophical, too ‘meta’,
to be imminent to the problem of power and
politicisation, thus bearing no essential role in
the everyday politics of precaritisation. At one
level, we recognise that this sequestration is
understandable since precarity only appears as
a tangible problem when it becomes distilled
into specific political relations. As Judith
Butler (2015) aptly puts it, when ‘articulated
in its specificity’ and so made ‘indissociable
from the dimension of politics’, precariousness
simply ‘ceases to be existential’ (p. 119).
However, in choosing to bracket the problem,
our concern is that the existential dimension
comes to be framed as something separate,
distinctive or irrelevant from concrete
questions of politics and power.
Our aim in this article is twofold. On the one
hand, we wish to illuminate what we see as the
problem – even the danger – of not acknowl-
edging the existential dimension of precarious-
ness and, hence, of not properly understanding
the depth of what it means that all affecting and
acting, governing and living, remains (and
always remains) fundamentally vulnerable. In
not acknowledging our incapacity to get rid of
vulnerability – by not tarrying with it as a con-
dition of all living – we risk misunderstanding
not simply the nature of vulnerability but the
nature of its potential to be mobilised through
various modalities of power. Our first aim, then,
is to illustrate how our vulnerability operates as
a condition that precedes and exceeds the vari-
ous capacities and formations of power that
attempt to mitigate, exploit or manipulate the
realities vulnerability situates. In doing so, we
hope to avoid the danger of becoming overly
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enamoured with precarity as a power technique,
and thus, approaching power as a manipulative
force of, rather than respondent to, the condition
of being vulnerable. In revealing how power is
quintessentially embedded in the existential
woundedness of living, we come to see power
not as a system of relations – whether under-
stood as social, historical, affective, corporeal,
epistemological, discursive and so on – but as a
response to (what we will term) a wound of
living. This leads to our second aim: namely,
to illustrate how a proper elaboration of power
and existential vulnerability fundamentally
alters our conception of what politics is and how
politics works. Power in our framing has no
ontological status in and of itself – neither as a
force nor as a relation – but is something that
emerges from the condition of being vulnerable.
This alters how we approach politics, or what
we call the ‘politics of wound’. For us, politics is
a response to the vulnerability imminent to
being a living being. Our second aim is to illus-
trate more fully the implications of not properly
seeing the existential woundedness that pre-
cedes any and every conception of power and
politics.1
Taken together, we would suggest that the
central task of this article is to illuminate how
existential vulnerability – what we will come to
call the woundedness of living – situates what
we understand to be the central problem of
power; a problem that (once understood prop-
erly) has the potential to fundamentally reorga-
nise what we understand power to be and how
we understand power to work. This problem can
be stated thus: there is no power that precedes
or exceeds the condition of existential vulner-
ability. To say that no power precedes vulner-
ability, we mean to say that there is no power
without or before vulnerability. To live is to be
vulnerable, and all uses and forms of power
need to respond to this condition. Woundedness
is, in this regard, the origin of power. This leads
to the second term: to say that no power exceeds
vulnerability, we mean that there is no power
that can resolve the problem that vulnerability
poses. There are no actions, events, capacities,
decisions or modes of willing that can make the
wound of living go away; nothing that can make
life impervious to its own vulnerability. Life’s
vulnerability exceeds all such gestures. To
understand the relation between power and vul-
nerability in such terms is to understand power
not as a relation, a will, a desire or even as a
force but first and foremost as a problem. Power
is, by definition, a problem of vulnerability.
Thus, while this article is about rethinking pol-
itics and power against the problem of wound-
edness, it is above all about understanding
vulnerability as power’s problem (Rose, 2007;
Joronen, 2019). It is about understanding that
power is a problem of vulnerability. And it is
about understanding vulnerability as a limit that
no power can ever resolve or exceed, but which
it nevertheless needs to respond to.
The argument is divided into three further
sections. In the second section, we review some
of the main avenues that constitute the current
literature on vulnerability, precarity, precar-
iousness and other cognate concepts. To be
clear, our aim here is not to review the totality
of the field but to show how our conception of
vulnerability grows from a wide-spread trend in
the existing literature to either ignore existential
vulnerability altogether or acknowledge it and
then quickly bracket it in favour of vulnerability
as a political practice, force or affect. The third
section develops a critique of this literature on
two grounds: first, through the tendency to onto-
logise power and second, through the inclina-
tion to see vulnerability as something produced
and manufactured. Drawing upon Butler and
others, we argue that the condition of being
wounded is one of being prone to vulnerability
in a manner that no power can surmount or
resolve. Vulnerability, in this rendering, is not
something that can be manufactured or pro-
duced but on the contrary is precisely what
undermines and disables all such efforts. Vul-
nerability, we argue, is the condition of being
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wounded. By this we mean to illuminate a hurt
at the heart of living; a tear or laceration that is
always open, always prone to being infected
that is part and parcel of our bodies, that is a
permanent part of all living. While this wound
can be shielded, tended and/or otherwise pro-
tected (by ourselves and others), it cannot be
healed. It does not go away. On the contrary,
existential vulnerability marks a wound that is
always there, something we live with, even as it
exposes the utter fragility of living. The final
section (4) develops our conception of wound-
edness through a particular perspective on pol-
itics. Specifically, it asks: what does it mean to
live with a wound? What are the implications
for thinking through questions of power, capac-
ity and change when we understand all living
beings as in need of care, as beings who are
always held out to a question of living and
whether this question will be exploited or cared
for? Understanding the ‘politics of wound’
means understanding all politics as essentially
a response to the problem of existential vulner-
ability – and a feeble one at that.
II Precarity, Power, Politics
As previously suggested, we begin by reviewing
some of the central bodies of literature currently
conceptualising precarity, vulnerability and
other related concepts in geography and cognate
disciplines. To summarise this expansive liter-
ature, we have divided it into four broad
branches: the regulation branch, the governing
branch, the social relations branch and the affect
branch. We recognise the dangers of being
overly reductive in such a wide-ranging review
and acknowledge the many important overlaps
and similarities between the branches. But
while there is obviously more diversity in this
work than we can give justice to, the review
serves a limited purpose, that is, to illustrate the
tendency to approach precarity as a political,
rather than existential condition.
The regulation branch is possibly the first in
the discipline to conceptualise precarity as a
distinctive historical type of power and thus rep-
resents perhaps the most established arena
where theories of precarity and precaritisation
(the creation of precarity) have been developed.
The central emphasis of this literature is on glo-
bal regimes of capital accumulation, particu-
larly on how they have worked to engender
structural precarities through the active devel-
opment of worker insecurity, for example, zero-
hour contracts, poor working conditions, lack of
future prospects, loss of social and political wel-
fare networks and forced migratory labour
(Lewis et al., 2015; Molé, 2010; Strauss, 2018;
Strauss and McGrath, 2017; Tyner, 2016). For
authors like Guy Standing (2011) and David
Harvey (2012), insecurity is the means by which
contemporary modes of capital accumulation
promote social regulation. Thus, precarity is
conceptualised as a tool for, as well as a product
of, uneven development and class inequality.
There are no doubt numerous topics that fall
within this broad description, for example, the
work on contemporary housing provisions, eco-
nomic migrants, exploitative wage relations and
the subsuming realities of neoliberal universi-
ties (see Berg et al, 2016; Springer, 2010; Waite,
2009). Here precarity is not simply an unin-
tended outcome of current modes of production
but the very means by which such economies
function. Some literatures connect this function-
ing to the activities of specific global and
national elites (see Ong, 2007; Springer,
2009), while elsewhere it is seen as a feature
of global networks of capital, and thus often
outside the jurisdiction and/or control of any
particular actor, body or a state (Hardt and
Negri, 2001; Harvey, 2005). In either case, this
work conceptualises precarity as a central fea-
ture of our increasingly globalised and net-
worked capitalist condition (cf. Neilson and
Rossiter, 2008).
Although the governance branch of the pre-
carity literature is in some ways parallel to the
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regulation branch, its emphases and concerns are
quite distinctive. In the broadest sense, this liter-
ature approaches precarity and precaritisation
as a modality of governing, though we can iden-
tify two distinct approaches within this general
characterisation. The first approach draws heav-
ily on Foucault, especially his later lectures on
neoliberalism, biopolitics and governmentality
(see Elden, 2016; Foucault, 2008; Legg, 2016;
Oksala, 2013), to explore how self-interest and
self-reliance operate as a key mechanism in
developing a neoliberal ‘art of governing’.By
framing subjects as economically autonomous
– that is, as skilled and resilient atoms who need
to endlessly adapt, compete, requalify and reskill
– they are positioned as key players in facilitating
neoliberal policies (e.g. Povinelli, 2011). By
improving oneself, by framing oneself and one’s
skills as ‘competitive’ and by making oneself
resilient in the face of vulnerable, unstable and
increasingly insecure conditions, subjects not
only come to internalise neoliberal precaritisa-
tion but are actively encouraged, even forced
through the demolition of political and economic
networks of support, to rely on their own self-
reliance and improvement (Lorey, 2015). It is
here that subjugation and empowerment become
a joint ‘art of governing’: a system where neo-
liberal precaritisation goes hand-in-hand with the
constitution of a subject who remains autono-
mous and self-reliant precisely due to unremit-
tingly vulnerable conditions outside the subject’s
control – for example, changing global labour
markets, competitive down-sizing, increasing
risks of illness, poverty, unemployment, home-
lessness and so on. As Berlant (2011), and many
others since then have argued, neoliberalisation
operates via ‘cruel optimism’: a hopeful narra-
tive of improvement that paradoxically makes
subjects more dependent, more vulnerable and
more directly beholden to the unaccountable pro-
mises of global capitalist competition.
The second approach focuses on a broader set
of techniques that states and state agencies use
to marginalise, control and/or exclude
vulnerable communities. Auyero (2012), for
instance, describes the prevalent role of bureau-
cratic slowness in maintaining the precarious
conditions among shanty town dwellers in con-
temporary Buenos Aires, while Berda (2017)
and Joronen (2017) illustrate how the ‘effective
inefficiency’ of bureaucratic processes operates
to maintain and install severe precarities among
Palestinian communities under Israeli occupa-
tion. Taken together, this work explores the
expansion of political techniques designed to
foster precarity, disorder and confusion to better
control certain sectors of society. Unsurpris-
ingly, such techniques often draw upon legacies
of racism, cultural exclusion and settler colonial
violence (e.g. Ettlinger, 2007; Gazit, 2015; Jor-
onen, 2019; Michel, 2016). In addition, while
much of this work focuses on the global south,
geographers reveal similar modes of precarisa-
tion at work in the US and European Union, for
instance, in regard to race or current immigra-
tion policies (e.g. Davies and Isakjee, 2019;
Lewis et al., 2015; Martin, 2015; Pulido,
2016; Repo, 2016; Waite & Lewis, 2017). What
distinguishes this approach to precarity from the
one above is a clear shift in focus from eco-
nomic precaritisation (which is endemic to neo-
liberal subjectification) to forms of governing
that operate on diverse sectors and use various
levers of state to keep the lives of certain groups
fragile, precarious and uncertain (see also
Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017; Rose, 2014).
This brings us to the social relations branch
of the precarity literature, which focuses on the
various ways of resisting, mitigating and/or act-
ing against, upon and in relation to politically
distributed precarities. Here we can see differ-
ent social networks of care and solidarity, famil-
ial relations, protests, social movements and
everyday modes of living that are not only
mobilised to struggle against existing vulner-
abilities in more subtle and self-organising ways
but are often born out of the shared sense of
vulnerability (Ferreri et al., 2017; Gambetti,
2016; Harker, 2012; Joronen 2019; Joronen and
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Griffiths 2019b). Christopher Harker (2012), for
instance, shows how familial relations constitute
ethical and political spaces that have played a
key role in reducing and alleviating heightened
exposure to precarity and colonial violence in
Palestine (see also Griffiths and Joronen, 2019;
Hammami, 2016). Alternatively, feminist scho-
lars have acknowledged the need to pay attention
to those manifold, often intimate ways through
which vulnerabilities are counter-mobilised as
means of corporeal resistance and political action
(e.g. Ba’, 2019; Brice, 2020; Mattoni and Doerr,
2007; Waite, 2009). Authors like Zeynep Gam-
betti (2016) and Judith Butler (2016), for
instance, have shown how the vulnerability of
the body can be mobilised, through disobedience
and peaceful protests, as means of non-violent
resistance against police violence and other
forms of state hostility. In sum, work in this
branch tends to focus less on state bodies (albeit
they might be seen as key agents of precaritisa-
tion and violence) and more on ways of mobilis-
ing and mitigating precarity through social
networks, bodily alignments and different rela-
tions of care, solidarity and support.
The final branch we discuss is the work on
atmospheres (or moods) of precarity. By draw-
ing explicitly on affect theory, this work
explores ways in which policies that undermine
access to the staples of everyday existence also
erode a subtler social fabric, a dynamic held
together not by institutional commitments,
codified law or cultural custom but by relational
interactions that embed certain expectations
about the future (Anderson, 2006, 2010; Horton,
2016). Precarity here is conceptualised as the
erosion of a certain faith or reliance on the
future and the oppressive sense of insecurity
that comes with that unreliability. It is also con-
ceptualised as something felt and embodied
(Coleman, 2016; Hitchen, 2016; Woodward and
Bruzzone, 2015). Atmospheres of precarity are
engendered not necessarily by things that are
happening but by things that might happen; it
is precisely the condition of not knowing that
creates pervasive feelings or tensions about the
insecurity of one’s situation.
We recognise two broad approaches within
this general description. The first explores how
precarity gets embedded into the state’s singular
right to perpetrate violence. Woodward and
Bruzzone (2015), for example, explore how
police in Wisconsin use minor inflections of
force or what they term ‘light touching’
(shoulder taps, security checks, pat downs etc.)
to remind populations of the state’s imminent
right to perpetuate violence. Tucker (2017)
similarly explores how everyday harassment,
particularly around key forms of livelihood,
inflects a perpetual sense of anxiety (also see
Secor, 2007). The second approach explores
how precarity is embedded in the action (or
inaction) of state services, particularly in an era
of austerity. Here the emphasis is on how imper-
sonal bureaucratic logics and calculative ideol-
ogies foment an aura of uncertainty about the
state’s commitment to the lives of marginal cit-
izens. Thus, Stenning (2020) makes a distinc-
tion between the events of austerity – for
example, redundancy and housing foreclosure
– and more everyday affects which create a per-
vasive psychosocial mood of unease, sadness
and resignation (also see Dawney et al., 2020;
Hitchen, 2016). While the practices described
here bear some resemblance to those in the gov-
ernance literature discussed in branch two, it is
distinguished by its emphasis on how state
agents manufacture what the authors term atmo-
spheres of perpetual vulnerability – a pervasive
sense of anxiety that operates as an affective
force. In this rendering, as Coleman (2016) sug-
gests, austerity is less an event and more a
national mood.
In sum, while there are a number of differ-
ences in the ways these branches approach the
condition of vulnerability, they are more cos-
metic than they may at first seem. Yes, these
literatures draw from diverse theoretical tradi-
tions (Marxism, poststructuralism, postcoloni-
alism, feminist theory etc.) and tap into
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different conceptual registers (affect, govern-
mentality, regulation, social relations, intimacy
etc.), but they collectively approach the ques-
tion of vulnerability, first and foremost, as a
modality of political control and struggle, that
is, as a question of power. Whether the focus is
on political economies, neoliberal subjectifica-
tion, (post)colonial power relations, affective
power or social mediations and political agen-
cies of power, it is power relations that funda-
mentally define the various forms that
vulnerability (as precarity) takes. To be clear,
this focus on power and politics is not a problem
in and of itself. The issue, rather, is not taking
seriously the elemental primacy of vulnerabil-
ity. The role of existential vulnerability, we
would argue, is omitted, and in doing so, the
distinctive configuration that takes shape
between vulnerability, power and politics is not
given proper attention. These problems are par-
ticularly evident in how states and other bodies
are seen as capable of manufacturing and pro-
ducing precarities, as if vulnerability would be
no more than a useful tool manufactured in the
hands of a governor. Even in those works where
the focus is more on reparative social forms, the
emphasis remains on the power to resist, mobi-
lise and use vulnerability. In either case, vulner-
ability appears not as an existential condition – a
condition that is primordial and thus comes
before and exceeds any and all forms of power
– but as a resource, something that can be
touched, shaped and transfigured by material
agencies towards an array of creative purposes
and political ends. The aim of the next section is
to illustrate the dangers of this rendering and
what is potentially lost when the existential
dimension is not fully recognised and
acknowledged.
III Vulnerability as a Condition
of Living: Limit, Origin, Response
The aim of this section is to question the incli-
nation to approach vulnerability as a product of
power – something composed, utilised and man-
ufactured by various uses and modes of power.
To be clear, we do not ignore or deny the various
ways agencies (in)operationalise vulnerability;
how a range of economic, governmental and
affective apparatuses, for example, make
choices about how and whether certain subjects,
groups or populations can be protected or
exposed to vulnerable situations. Our aim,
rather, is to tarry with that original situation: the
existential condition that subtends any and all
power to intensify or mitigate vulnerability. We
do this by making two specific points. First, we
highlight the problem with conceptualising vul-
nerability as a positive force. While it is often
presumed that social phenomena can be ana-
lysed and understood as effects of force (expres-
sions of power), vulnerability, we show, marks
out a limit. It is not a capacity that can produce,
affect or enliven but something that incapaci-
tates, un-powers and so ultimately limits such
endeavours. In this regard, vulnerability does
not allow us another, more novel ontological
standpoint but names the limit of all ontologisa-
tion. Second, we argue that there are no func-
tions or uses of power that could be understood
as an origin or cause of vulnerability. While
states, for instance, can make political choices
about how, when and in what sense certain
populations become more (or less) exposed to
vulnerability, and while these vulnerabilities
can be (en)countered through practices of care,
protection, mitigation, refusal and so on, none
of these are the origin of vulnerability per se. On
the contrary, we argue that vulnerability names
the irresolvable origin of all power. We have
organised the following discussion around these
two points.
In terms of the first point, it seems to have
become common place in the discipline (and
beyond) to understand power as a fundamen-
tally relational concept. So common place that
it would seem axiomatic. While this approach
has been around for some time, it has no doubt
intensified over the last two decades as critical
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human geography has moved from understand-
ing power as having an epistemological func-
tion – as it did in new cultural geography and
many of the theoretical positions established
during the ‘cultural turn’ – to seeing it as onto-
logical. Deleuze has been particularly influen-
tial in this regard. Rather than approaching
bodies as noumenal phenomenon whose physi-
cal and representational appearance is orche-
strated through various modes of social
construction, Deleuze understands them as vital
becomings: composites of unfolding energies
whose shape and capacities express the affec-
tive interactions from which they emerge. In
appropriating these frameworks, geographers
have come to think of bodies in relation to the
forces that engender them; energies which have
no origin in and of themselves but simply are
(for a thorough discussion, see Anderson and
Harrison, 2006; Marston et al., 2005; McCor-
mack, 2007; McFarlane, 2009; Müller and
Schurr, 2016; Ruddick, 2012; Shaw, 2013;
Thrift, 2008; also cf. Barnett, 2008).2 Thus,
while the relation between forces needs to be
explained, as do the various events that arise
from force differentials, force itself is thought
as something that is beyond explanation. It is, in
Heidegger’s opprobrious use of the word, meta-
physical: a presumption upon which the ontol-
ogies of vital becoming rest upon (Joronen and
Häkli, 2017; see also Joronen, 2013). The world
is framed as a world of forces, energies which
exist as ontological conditions defining the dis-
tributed coming to being of things, relations and
worlds.
It is this ontologisation of force, power and
capacity that we want to put into question when
approaching the question of vulnerability. Far
from seeing vulnerability as yet another compo-
sition of power, composed through assembling
relations and encounters, we see it as power’s
fundamental limit – a limit that is imminent to
life itself. As Judith Butler (2010) suggests in
her famous work on precarity, what makes life
precarious (i.e. vulnerable) is not simply that it
relies upon certain inputs and needs – that is,
certain external conditions that determine
whether life flourishes or withers – but that
those inputs and needs are ones which no living
being has the capacity to ensure. As she states,
‘there are no conditions that can fully “solve”
the problem of . . . bodies . . . they are subject to
incursions and to illnesses that jeopardize the
possibility of persisting at all’ (Butler, 2010:
29). Vulnerability is, in this regard, a constitu-
tional feature of all bodily beings; bodies
depend on that which is beyond themselves to
be sustained, to the extent that ‘to live is always
to live a life that is at risk’, vulnerable to non-
sustaining (p. 30). The key point we take from
here is that life involves an ongoing encounter
with a dimension that limits and remains beyond
the capacities of any living being, and thus of
any relational form through which these capa-
cities might actualise. Paul Harrison (2007)
aptly calls such encounters a ‘relation with the
nonrelational’ – something which life is con-
stantly related to but whose existence is never
captured or resolved through such relations
(also see Hannah, 2019; Harrison, 2008). Vul-
nerability simply stands over and beyond all
power and capacity: it denotes something which
living beings constantly need to deal with and
relate to, but which they have no power to ever
resolve. Vulnerability is an encounter with a
problem over which bodies have no sover-
eignty. It denotes a limit condition – it marks
a situation which we (and all living beings) are
only ever exposed to.
It is only when vulnerability is seen in such
terms that we can fully understand why it cannot
be conceived as something manufactured or
produced. On the contrary, vulnerability
denotes an un-power, a crack in all power and
its capacities. The point, again, is not simply
that living beings are vulnerable to a world that
hurts, inflicts and infects, but that we can do
nothing to change this state of affairs. Take the
problem of hunger. As Rose (2014) suggests,
hunger is not simply a problem of having (or
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not having) food. Having food is a problem that
we can potentially put into relation – that is, we
can produce and distribute food and thus choose
to mitigate (or exacerbate) hunger. But hunger
itself stands beyond relation. The facticity of the
body’s hunger is a situation that cannot be
escaped or eluded. It stands before us as a prob-
lem that demands to be permanently (and unre-
lentingly) addressed. Thus, while feeding is a
problem that depends on social and political
relations, hunger is a problem that stands
beyond those relations. It is something to which
our bodies are wholly and unremittingly behol-
den, marking our powerlessness and growing
from the un-powering condition of our fragile
existence. Hunger, in other words, points at our
foundational vulnerability. It underlines how
vulnerability does not ‘do’ but demarcates the
limits of all doing, and ultimately, of existing. It
is in this regard that vulnerability brings to the
fore the impossibility to ontologise life in terms
of positive forces. Vulnerability operates by
limiting and undoing – by incapacitating life –
and thus cannot serve as a ground, form or any
other ontological nominator for it. It is ulti-
mately what ungrounds and takes away.
This leads to our second point, namely, the
problem of framing productive power (the
capacity to affect, govern, protect, resist etc.)
as the origin of vulnerability. Our argument here
is that power – its uses, its productive capacities,
the abilities it claims for itself – is not the origin
of vulnerability but, quite the reverse, vulner-
ability poses the origin of all power. In saying
this, we do not wish to diminish the capacity of
powerful agents to use violence (or the threat of
violence) to perpetuate insecurity or to generate
painful, even brutal effects. Nor do we wish to
erase the diverse modes of care that can be
mobilised to engender unique forms of security,
solidarity and hope. Rather, our argument is that
all such capacities to heal and hurt, to ‘wound
and care’ (Cavanero, 2009: 30), emerge from a
context of radical existential alterity and fragi-
lity over which they have no power. In other
words, the condition of being wounded, as well
as the condition of being shielded from it, is pre-
established by the situation of being prone to
vulnerability in the first place. Wounding and
caring are not grounded on productive capaci-
ties of power but are responses to this originary
situation. In not acknowledging this, that is, in
presenting vulnerability as yet another affective
force (Anderson, 2014: 128–129), we miss how
vulnerability emerges not from bodies, affects
or distributed agencies but from a situation that
sits outside such relations and their terms; a
situation no power can ever eliminate or incor-
porate; namely, from the woundedness of being
a living being. Vulnerability, in other words,
names an existential situation which power can
only ever respond to. To not recognise this is to
bestow the capacity to choose whether life
remains vulnerable or not; as if vulnerability
were something created or potentially uncre-
ated, as if vulnerability was escapable, as if
there were a potential, a possibility, of a world,
a life or a modality of existence, where life
could be omnipotently secured and safeguarded
from its woundedness. It is such abiding wound-
edness that poses a constant call upon us. While
we can certainly respond to specific insecurities
in our bodily, socially, politically and geogra-
phically bound lives by acting upon/against/
with/in favour of them, our existential prone-
ness to vulnerability remains – it is always and
essentially unresolvable, and yet, something
that constantly calls us to respond. In this sense,
vulnerability names the irresolvable origin of all
power.
Taken together, the two points above illus-
trate why vulnerability cannot be posed as one
force among the others (Anderson, 2014;
Anderson and Wilson, 2018; Coleman, 2016;
Wilkinson and Ortega-Alcazar, 2019). Rather,
it names an original incompleteness and a sense
of limits. While a productive power always
names a capacity and ability to affect – the
‘functioning of the possible’, as Maurice Blan-
chot aptly puts it (1995: 8) – what we argue
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defines vulnerability, is the way it exposes life
to what undoes, un-powers and limits its capa-
cities. And yet it is precisely this limit condition
that situates vulnerability as the origin of all
power. In bringing living beings face-to-face
with vulnerability, those beings are summoned
to respond. All living beings seek capacity in
the face of its peculation; fragile constellations
of power coming to the fore for their finite time
as a response to the problem no constellation of
power can resolve. This is the essential problem
of power. Even as vulnerability calls power to
respond, it also laughs at all such effects; the
content of its gift is empty. Power is hence
always already fractured, undermined, lacerated
through and through by its own woundedness;
its own incapacity to resolve the problem for
which it was summoned. Recognising the
woundedness at the heart of power is to resist
being enamoured. It is to see that whenever rela-
tions of power are countered, it is their inherent
fragility and limitedness that is highlighted;
whenever power remains powerful, it is the vul-
nerability and exposure of life that is required;
whenever vulnerabilities are healed and nursed,
or mobilised as means to govern and dominate,
vulnerability keeps lingering within these
endeavours, abiding with them as their own
most impossibility, fragility and finiteness
(e.g. Joronen, 2017, 2019; Rose, 2014). This is
the politics of living with vulnerability – the
politics of living with the woundedness that
does not heal. It is this indispensable need to
respond to this woundedness which we elabo-
rate next.
IV Politics of Wound: Beholden
Claims
Above, we have explored how vulnerability
exposes a fundamental hurt or a wound at the
heart of living, what we are calling ‘the wound-
edness of being a living being’. This wound is
part and parcel of all living beings; it is always
there, open and raw, impossible to heal or erase.
We further argued that this wound is the irresol-
vable origin of power, something power needs
to respond to without being able to resolve.
Thus, even as woundedness names the origin
of every act and position of power, we need to
understand all such acts and positions (and the
modes of power they create) as always already
enfeebled, compromised or, what we term,
wounded. All power simultaneously responds
to and is hampered by the wound at its heart; a
wound whose opening can never be healed by
the diverse forms of power it calls forth. In this
section, we show how such woundedness
engenders what we call the ‘politics of wound’;
a politics that operates with the woundedness of
living.
It is our contention that the politics of the
wound introduces a very different conception
of politics. It is a perspective that cannot be
paralleled with more established readings in
geography (and beyond) that ground politics
in action (e.g. Arendt, 1958), power (e.g. Legg,
2016), affect (e.g. Woodward, 2014) or other
productive capacities (e.g. Anderson, 2014) –
that is, concepts that celebrate the diverse trans-
figurations of doing. On the contrary, this is a
politics of supplication, borne from the condi-
tion of being wounded. In this sense, it bears
some similarity to conceptions of politics that
emphasise receptiveness and ‘response-ability’
(e.g. Barad, 2007, Beausoleil, 2015; Brown
et al., 2019; Haraway, 2008; Joronen and Häkli,
2017). However, while these works connect the
responding nature of politics to the ever-present
prevalence of the other (Barad, 2014: 161), mul-
tispecies responsibilities (Haraway, 2008: 88–
93), affective relations between bodies (Thrift,
2008: 175–176) or to the ontologising event
(Joronen and Häkli, 2017: 572–573), our con-
cept is connected to the existential condition of
woundedness itself. To illustrate this politics
more thoroughly, we suggest it can be charac-
terised by three distinct features: first, the poli-
tics of the wound is beholden; second, it cannot
be thought or determined in terms of its doings;
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and finally, it is always and fundamentally lim-
ited in terms of its claim to power. The remain-
der of this section explores these features in
more detail.
In terms of the first implication, understand-
ing power as responsive situates the scene of
politics in very different terms. When power is
understood as primordially productive, active
and vital, politics appears as a relational process
where forces are enrolled to create, produce or
operationalise particular apparatus, systems or
machines. At the heart of such a conception is an
image of the subject – or other actant (distribu-
ted, non-human etc.) – as essentially capable of
politicising. To be sure we understand that this
capacity is conceived as emergent in and
through relations and the various ways those
relations unfold. Our response to this position
is not that there is no choice, nor is it to suggest
that subjects or actants cannot be politically
creative. But it is to suggest that as a response,
our politics cannot be thought in terms of deci-
sion, choice or freedom. On the contrary, our
conception of politics begins with a living being
who is utterly and wholly beholden. All politics
starts from this situation. And while politics is
certainly activated by the situation of beholden-
ness, we must understand such activations as
taking shape within the limited terms that vul-
nerability provides. Such a conception is similar
to Foucault’s in the sense that we understand
power (relations) as something from which we
can never fully escape (e.g. Foucault, 2014;
Legg, 2018). It is something to which we are
bound in our need to respond. And yet, what is
ultimately inescapable for us is the wound itself.
It is because our being is beholden to a vulner-
ability that transcends anything that a subject,
group, actant, agent or any other (relational)
power could ever do, that politics can never be
a question of escape. On the contrary, politics
marks precisely the impossibility of escaping
our beholdenness; the impossibility of finding
a safe haven; a space beyond where one could
potentially live unwounded and unexposed.
This leads to the second implication; namely,
that the politics of the wound expands our hor-
izon of what potentially counts as politics. In
our discussion, there is no compelling need to
frame politics as something active, vital or pro-
ductive, altogether ‘capable’ and ‘powerful’.
Indeed, to think of politics as a response means
approaching it not in terms of the bright light of
action that we can see or the emergent forces
that power sets in motion, but in terms of the
diverse responses that woundedness elicits. The
key to understanding this position is to recog-
nise that a response can be anything. It can be
active and passive, real and imagined, activat-
ing and deactivating, creative and suggestive.
Because power is predicated on a primordial
dimension of exposure, vulnerability takes
shape in infinite ways. We are prone to the
unpredictability of other people, to the harsh-
ness of the elements, to the unknowability of
the future; there is nothing that is not a potential
threshold of exposure. Given this, we can imag-
ine politics – when understood as a response –
taking shape in equally infinite ways of
responding. Indeed, to perceive power and pol-
itics in terms of the wound is to perceive how
diverse and creative responding to the wound
can be. For example, elsewhere we have
explored modalities of politics that are operatio-
nalised through inaction and withdrawal, that is,
by not producing institutional orders of protec-
tion and care (see Joronen, 2017; Rose, 2014).
In such instances, it is precisely the vulnerabil-
ity of living that is being exploited to evoke
harm. Politics in these forms is a politics of
inaction, deferral and retreat, rather than doing,
creating or producing. The point is that whether
taking the form of harming and killing,
improvement and care, abandonment and repu-
diation, resistance and countering, action or
inaction or solidarity and help, it is not power,
but woundedness, that allows power to remain
powerful – capable of being affective. It is for
this reason that we understand politics as the
capacity to play with life’s fragile situation. It
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finds its power, not from the capacity to affect
nor from the power to resist but from creatively
mining the cracks of life. For Derrida (2001;
Derrida and Grossman, 2019), such cracks are
precisely wounds: openings that scar our bodies
and fracture our soul but also prompt a multi-
tude of ideas concerning how we attempt sover-
eignty over our lives. Thus, while politics is
limited in terms of what it can achieve, it is not
limited in terms of the forms and shapes it can
take to respond to and play with the wounded-
ness of living.
This leads to the final implication. The poli-
tics of response can never be omnipotent or
heroic. What the wound exposes is that politics
is fragile, compromised from the beginning and
thus susceptible to denial, encounter, transfor-
mation and resistance. To understand this, we
need to understand politics as a thoroughly para-
doxical event. On the one hand, it is the wound
that affects the very constitution of power – it
defines it, calls it, limits it and grants it its
power. And yet, it does so in a manner that no
actual form of power (no actual response) can
ever resolve. It is the fact that we must be hungry
that the will arises to feed, it is the fact that we
must be cold that the will arises to shelter and it
is that fact that we cannot see the future that the
will arises to prepare and anticipate. But in
doing so, vulnerability ensures that no prepara-
tion, no shelter and no food can heal the wound
itself. We will always be hungry, we will always
need shelter and no preparation will ever fully
protect us from the vulnerability of the future.
Power, in this regard, is a double bind: it creates
a site of obligation – a demand to feed, to shel-
ter, to heal and to prepare – and simultaneously
a site of futility. On the one hand, we cannot not
respond to vulnerability. But on the other, no
response will ever be sufficient. The wound at
the heart of politics does not simply disappear in
the shadow of power’s will to virility. On the
contrary, it follows politics, haunts it, lacerates
it and ensures that its capacity remains incom-
plete. Giving with one hand and taking back
with the other, the wound activates politics by
virtue of ensuring its failure.
To suggest that power is not (and can never
be) heroic is thus to recognise that power oper-
ates by virtue of its incapacity and enfeeble-
ment. It is the perpetual irresolution of power
– the fact that it can never resolve the problem
that gave it life – that guarantees its future. It is
the fact that power cannot close the wound that
it must emerge (again and again) to resolve the
matter. Power is the futility of Lear, screaming
into the storm; a power that may be loud, reso-
lute, caring and even nourishing but is ulti-
mately defined not by what it affects but what
it fails to affect – what it can never affect. This is
why we should be wary of being enamoured by
what power does. Yes, power emerges in ever
new creative forms. But the ingenuity of its
shape – the complexity of its apparatus – should
not be confused with its efficacy. This is not to
say that politics cannot cause harm. We are not
denying that politics can and does perpetuate
cruelty, pain and injustice in how it distributes
vulnerabilities. But no such pain could be
caused if life were not already prone to it. Natu-
rally, the reverse is also true: all power is
wounded and cracked open to numerous ways
of mitigating, cancelling, refusing and playing
with its forms. It is in this sense that power is
always already hampered by its own wounded-
ness. Power can only ever be a limited claim to
power – a limited desire for power – in the face
of the vulnerability that gives it life; an always
already failed ambition to resolve the problem
whose very problematic breaths it into being.
V Conclusion
This article is about what a proper engagement
with vulnerability can tell us about the nature of
power and the avenue it opens-up for rethinking
politics in terms of its woundedness; what we
term the ‘politics of wound’. While the current
theoretical milieu celebrates capacity, force and
potential and attends to all the things that power
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can do, our aim has been to provide a check on
this exuberance by illuminating the existential
situation in which all such claims to power sit.
In doing so, we have argued that the problem of
power transforms from being a question about
how to produce, capacitate and affect, to how to
respond to life’s woundedness. This means
rejecting both the fantasy of omnipotent force
and the politics of futility. Indeed, our critique
resides precisely in between such terms: the
inclination to think politics in terms of strong
or weak, loud or quiet, effective or ineffective,
revolutionary or supplementary, healing or
harming, countering or affirmative – that is, in
terms of mere doing (see also Athanasiou,
2016). It is only when we begin from a position
of beholdenness, when we start with the pre-
sumption that no response is ever heroic, able
or sufficient enough, that our conception of pol-
itics makes room for thinking politics in a man-
ner that is far more sensitive to spatial and
ontological differentiation than productivist,
supplementalist and vitalist frameworks can
measure. In this sense, our aim is not simply
to unmask our everyday political apparatus,
but more importantly to unground them, to
un-power them and to bring them back to the
vulnerability at their heart. Such an approach
not only offers a critical reading of prevalent
forms of power but, more importantly, under-
mines their modes of ontologisation, whether
related to affect, gender, subject-making, race
or some other mode of differentiation (e.g.
Blaser, 2014; Joronen and Häkli, 2017; Sund-
berg, 2014; Tolia-Kelly, 2006). Yet, this should
not be the sole take-away point. Understanding
politics as a response further allows us to
explore the wide-ranging capacities living
beings summon to mitigate, exacerbate or oth-
erwise mobilise power as a responding play with
vulnerability. Understanding power in such
terms helps us avoid the tendency to be enam-
oured by power and opens our perspective to
recognise politics in terms of its manifold behol-
denness and its infinite responsiveness. This is a
politics that works not by celebrating or hailing
but by recognising and acknowledging a collec-
tive starting point: the incurable wound of being
a living being.
Notes
1. To emphasise the reliance of power on vulnerability,
we use ‘vulnerability’ and ‘woundedness’ to refer to the
existential dimension, and ‘power’ to the political
dimension, or what we refer to as the ‘politics of
wound’. Although this goes against the grain of rather
established distinction between precarity (as political)
and precariousness/vulnerability (as existential) – a dif-
ference, which we do elaborate when appropriate to
literatures we are referring to – our choice of wording,
in this regard, is intentional.
2. Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche plays a powerful underlying
role in the way power and force have been ontologi-
cised in the discipline. Like Aristotle’s physis, Plato’s
eidos or Hegel’s spirit, Nietzsche’s concept of willing,
in all of its vital movement and open-endedness of the
world, poses an elemental condition constitutive for the
becoming of worldly things. In Deleuze’s (1983) read-
ing, Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ represents an original
wanting, an underlying primordial energy that arises
from the differential encounters between forces. Will-
ing suffuses the world. All phenomena and events are
borne of willing and the movements and differentials
that these energies engender. Thus, willing is, as
Nietzsche (1968) suggests, ‘the most elementary fact
from which a becoming arises’ (p. 339).
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